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 Attention selects stimuli for cognitive processing, and the mechanisms that underlie 
the process of attentional selection have been a major topic of psychological research for 
over 30 years. From this research, it has been well documented that attentional selection 
can proceed both voluntarily, driven by visual search goals, and involuntarily, driven by the 
physical salience of stimuli. In this dissertation, I provide a conceptual framework for 
attentional control that emphasizes the need for stimulus selection to promote the survival 
and wellbeing of an organism. I argue that although goal-driven and salience-driven 
mechanisms of attentional selection fit within this framework, a central component that is 
missing is a mechanism of attentional selection that is uniquely driven by learned 
associations between stimuli and rewards. I go on to present evidence for such a value-
driven mechanism of attentional selection, and describe how this mechanism functions 
independently of the well documented salience-driven and goal-driven mechanisms. I 
conclude by arguing that reward learning modifies the attentional priority of stimuli, 
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Chapter I: Introduction and Theoretical Framework 
Material from this chapter was originally published in:  
Anderson, B. A. (2013). A value-driven mechanism of attentional selection. Journal of Vision, 
13(3):7, 1-16. 
 
The external world presents a large amount of information to be processed by an 
organism. Visual scenes often contain many different objects, each of which is comprised of 
many component features. Representing these objects and features is a fundamental task of 
the visual system, as what is represented will then be available for higher-order cognitive 
processes such as reasoning, decision making, and memory storage.  
Given the large amount of information contained in visual scenes, the brain's ability 
to represent all of this information is severely limited. Stimuli compete for representation in 
the brain, requiring a process of selection by which selected objects are represented at the 
expense of others (e.g., Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Reynolds, Chelazzi, & Desimone, 1999). 
This core mechanism of selection is referred to as selective attention, and it has been the 
topic of intense investigation for over 30 years.  
1. Attentional Priority as a Function of Stimulus Value 
 Which stimuli are selected by attention has important implications for the survival 
and wellbeing of an organism. In order for a stimulus to be acted upon, it must first be 
attended such that it becomes available to resource-limited cognitive systems such as 
working memory and decision making. Stimuli that are not attended often fail to reach 
awareness (Mack & Rock, 1998; Most et al., 2001; Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997). How 
quickly a stimulus is selected via attention is also of critical importance. By more rapidly 
attending to a stimulus, individuals maximize the amount of time they have to act upon the 
stimulus. Failing to rapidly attend to a stimulus may result in a missed opportunity to obtain 




 I argue here that attentional priority reflects the overall value of selecting the 
different stimuli in an environment. Core mechanisms of computing attentional priority will 
evolve to the extent that they increase the likelihood that an organism will survive and 
thrive. More specifically, attentional priority will be computed in such a way that, if the 
same computations are repeated over many instances, these computations will maximize 
the rewards and minimize the losses experienced by the organism. Although the attentional 
priority of a particular stimulus in a particular context will not always be adaptive, the 
computations that underlie attentional priority will give rise to selection that is as adaptive 
as possible in the long run. 
 Two mechanisms of attentional selection have been well defined in the literature: a 
goal-driven mechanism and a salience-driven mechanism (e.g., Connor, Egeth, & Yantis, 
2004; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). I briefly review each one here, and argue that each is 
consistent with a value-based framework for the computation of attentional priority. An 
attentional system optimized to maximize rewards and minimize losses will prioritize both 
goals and salience in determining which stimuli are selected. 
1.1. Goal-Driven Attentional Selection 
 Our goals are often adaptive. When we are hungry, we search for food. When we 
know danger may be present, we look for it and try to avoid it. Our goals are also very 
flexible and can rapidly adapt to changes in expectations and task demands (e.g., Anderson 
& Folk, 2012a, 2014; Lien, Ruthruff, & Johnston, 2010). Thus, it would seem useful for an 
adaptive system of attentional control to be able to factor ongoing goals into the 
computation of attentional priority.  
 A wealth of research demonstrates that currently active goals play a powerful role 
in computing attentional priority. Attention can be deployed to a particular location when 




target (e.g., Posner, 1980). Such deliberate attention allocation can greatly reduce 
distraction by stimuli outside of the focus of attention (Yantis & Johnston, 1990). Goal-
driven attentional control can also operate through the prioritization of stimulus features. 
Knowledge of the specific features of the upcoming target increases the efficiency of visual 
search, such that attentional selection can be largely restricted to stimuli that possess a 
target-defining feature (Egeth, Virzi, & Garbhart, 1984; Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel, 1989; Wolfe, 
1994). 
 Goal-driven attentional selection is at times voluntary and deliberate, but may 
proceed rapidly and automatically as well. When the target of visual search is known in 
advance, stimuli that possess a target-defining feature capture attention. This is referred to 
as contingent attentional capture (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992). Distractors that 
share the defining feature of the target selectively produce a spatial cuing effect consistent 
with attentional selection (Anderson & Folk, 2010, 2012b; Folk & Anderson, 2010; Folk, 
Leber, & Egeth, 2002; Folk & Remington, 1998; Folk et al., 1992). This goal-related 
selectivity in attentional selection is further supported by eye movement measures (Ludwig 
& Gilchrist, 2002, 2003) and neurophysiological indices of stimulus processing (e.g., Eimer 
& Kiss, 2008; Serences et al., 2005; Serences & Yantis, 2007). Contingent attentional capture 
is adaptive in that it rapidly orients attention to likely targets, facilitating more rapid target 
localization, at the possible expense of selecting feature-similar nontargets that need to be 
rejected. It reflects a hybrid form of voluntary and involuntary attentional control—the 
instantiation of the goal state is voluntary, while the allocation of attention that follows is 
not. 
1.2. Salience-Driven Attentional Selection 
Our goals will not always encapsulate what is relevant to our survival in a given 




themselves, such as a predator leaping out from hiding. In addition, goal-directed 
attentional control is cognitively demanding to maintain, and individuals experience 
periodic lapses in the ability to efficiently carry out deliberate visual search (Leber, Turk-
Browne, & Chun, 2008; Leber, 2010; Lechak & Leber, 2012). A mechanism of attentional 
selection that can function independently of ongoing goals would be adaptive provided that 
the benefits of having attention automatically captured outweigh the cost of potential for 
distraction from goal-directed processing. 
 Attentional selection is influenced by physical stimulus salience. Visual search for a 
target is slowed by the presence of a physically salient nontarget (Theeuwes, 1991, 1992, 
1994, 2010; Yantis & Jonides, 1984), which involuntarily draws eye movements (e.g., 
Theeuwes, de Vries, & Godijn, 2003; Van der Stigchel & Theeuwes, 2005). Computational 
models that can account for the search behavior of observers place a strong emphasis on 
the physical salience of stimuli (e.g., Itti & Koch, 2001). The capture of attention by 
physically salient stimuli is also supported by neurophysiological measures that show 
preferential processing of a salient distractor (e.g., Hickey, McDonald, & Theeuwes, 2006; 
but see McDonald, Green, Jannati, & Di Lollo, 2013).  
 The extent to which salience-driven attentional priority can be overridden by goal-
driven attentional control is currently a matter of debate. Physically salient stimuli that do 
not match a currently active target template have consistently failed to produce evidence of 
attentional capture using both behavioral (e.g., Folk et al., 1992; Folk & Remington, 1998) 
and neurophysiological measures (Eimer & Kiss, 2008, 2010; Lien, Ruthruff, Goodin, & 
Remington, 2008). Salient but task-irrelevant stimuli most robustly capture attention when 
the features of the upcoming target cannot be anticipated (e.g., Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Folk & 
Anderson, 2010), suggesting that goal-driven attentional control may be capable of gating 




controversy (see Acta Psychologica, vol 135(2), for a review and commentary), and whether 
goals or salience play the more dominant role in determining which stimulus is selected via 
attention remains a contested issue (e.g., Anderson & Folk, 2012b; Belopolsky, Schreij, & 
Theeuwes, 2010; Sawaki & Luck, 2010; Theeuwes, 2010). 
 Salient visual events can carry important information concerning potential reward 
availability or danger. The abrupt appearance of a new object is highly attention grabbing 
(Yantis & Hillstrom, 1994), and rapidly assessing this event in order to plan a response, if 
appropriate, would be beneficial for an organism. The temporary distraction from goal-
directed processing caused by attentional capture is often very brief (e.g., Theeuwes, 1991, 
1992) and can be contrasted with the potential cost of missing an opportunity to procure an 
available reward or escape danger, particularly when the opportunity is fleeting. 
Computational modeling suggests that a bias for attending to salient stimuli can serve in the 
interest of maximizing overall reward procurement (Laurent, 2008). 
1.3. Beyond Salience and Goals 
 So far, I have argued that mechanisms for computing attentional priority serve in 
the interest of maximizing rewards and minimizing losses, and that salience-driven and 
goal-driven mechanisms of attentional selection are consistent with this framework. But are 
these two mechanisms sufficient to satisfy the requirements of a system built to secure the 
survival and wellbeing of an organism? I propose that an adaptive system of attentional 
selection must also be understood in terms of the influence of prior reward learning. 
Reward-related stimuli will not always be physically salient, nor will an organism always be 
searching for a particular reward-related stimulus when it is encountered. An attentional 
system that only factors goals and salience into the computation of priority for selection is 
likely to result in missed opportunities to obtain a reward or escape danger, as both goals 




attentional priority is truly rooted in maximizing rewards and minimizing losses, this would 
predict a direct influence of the learned value of stimuli on selection, such that stimuli that 
have been learned to predict reward compete for selection regardless of their salience and 
goal-relevance. 
2. Evidence that Attentional Selection is Shaped by Rewards 
 Here, I review recent evidence that attentional selection can be shaped by the 
reward structure of the environment. Ecologically pertinent stimuli have high priority for 
attentional selection, attention is biased to select stimuli associated with reward, and 
attentional selection can be primed by recent reward feedback. The implications of these 
results, both in terms of our understanding of mechanisms of attentional selection and in 
terms of the proposed framework, are then discussed. 
2.1. Ecologically Pertinent Stimuli Capture Attention 
 Certain stimuli that are particularly important to promoting survival and wellbeing 
have been shown to have high attentional priority. For example, socially relevant stimuli 
capture attention (e.g., a happy face, Hodsoll, Vinding, & Lavie, 2011), as do sexually 
relevant stimuli (e.g., a naked body, Most, Smith, Cooter, Levy, & Zald, 2007). Although this 
provides evidence of involuntary attentional capture by valuable stimuli, the mechanisms 
that underlie such attentional selection are unclear. One potential explanation for the high 
attentional priority of ecologically pertinent stimuli is that they have acquired learned value 
through repeated pairings with reward, and it is this representation of learned value that is 
driving attention. At the same time, however, such effects can also be explained by 
mechanisms that do not implicate learning. For example, a bias to attend to socially relevant 
stimuli is evident from infancy (e.g., Farroni, Csibra, Simion, & Johnson, 2002; Farroni et al., 
2005; Franz, 1961), consistent with an inherited attentional bias that precedes learning. 




methodologies in which the stimulus–reward associations that underlie observed 
attentional biases are experimentally controlled.  
2.2. Reward Modulates Efficiency of Selection in Visual Search 
 Selection processes in visual search are influenced by stimulus–reward associations. 
Selection of a target amongst nontargets is more efficient when the target is associated with 
the delivery of a reward (e.g., Kiss, Driver, & Eimer, 2009; Kristjansson, Sigurjonsdottir, & 
Driver, 2010). Even with complex reward structures, individuals are able to allocate 
attentional priority to different targets in order to maximize total reward procurement 
(Navalpakkam, Koch, & Perona, 2009; Navalpakkam, Koch, Rangel, & Perona, 2010). When 
stimulus selection is rewarded, individuals make more efficient use of cue information to 
restrict attentional processing (Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010). Such effects of reward on 
attention can be explained by reward operating through the enhancement of goal-directed 
control, reflecting motivated performance. 
 Evidence from human functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
psychophysics, and single unit recording in rats and monkeys further supports the notion 
that associations with reward modulate the attentional priority of stimuli. The response to a 
stimulus in early visual areas can be predicted from the recent reward history of that 
stimulus, and this response adapts to reflect changes in experienced reward (Serences, 
2008). Orientation tuning becomes sharper for orientations that are associated with reward 
outcome (Serences & Saproo, 2010), a process that can proceed even without conscious 
awareness (Seitz, Kim, & Watanabe, 2009). When a stimulus is learned to predict high 
reward, it persistently evokes increased activity in the lateral intraparietal area (area LIP) 
(Peck, Jangraw, Suzuki, Efem, & Gottlieb, 2009), and stimulus-evoked activity in area V1 of 





 Learned stimulus–reward associations have been further shown to affect 
subsequent attentional selection. In one study, participants learned to associate different 
faces with different monetary reward outcomes in a training phase, and these faces later 
appeared as targets in a subsequent attentional blink task. Faces previously associated with 
high monetary gains or losses were more accurately reported than other faces when 
presented as the second of two targets, suggesting that they had higher attentional priority 
(Raymond & O’Brien, 2009). In a similar study reported by Della Libera and Chelazzi 
(2009), stimuli previously associated with high and low rewards could appear as both 
targets and nontargets in a subsequent object identification task. Stimuli previously 
associated with high reward were more rapidly identified as targets and more slowly 
rejected as distractors, while the opposite was true for stimuli previously associated with 
low reward (see also Della Libera, Perlato, & Chelazzi, 2011). 
Reward-motivated attentional priorities can also influence the selection of task-
irrelevant stimuli in much the same way that task goals influence selection in contingent 
attentional capture. Participants engaged in a Stroop task in which quickly and accurately 
naming particular colors was met with a monetary reward. These rewarded colors were 
named more quickly than other, non-rewarded colors, indicating that attentional priorities 
for the colors reflected the reward structure (Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010). 
Importantly, words that named a reward-associated color produced greater response time 
interference than other color-words, which was further supported by associated increases 
in neural activity in the presupplementary motor area as revealed through human fMRI 
(Krebs, Boehler, Egner, & Woldorff, 2011). 
2.3. Reward Primes Attentional Selection 
 When a stimulus is selected on a given trial, the selection of that stimulus is 




of pop-out (e.g., Belopolsky et al., 2010; Folk & Remington, 2008; Found & Müller, 1996; 
Müller, Heller, & Ziegler, 1995; Müller, Reimann, & Krummenacher, 2003; Kristjansson & 
Campana, 2010; Maljkovic & Nakayama 1994; Theeuwes & Van der Berg, 2011). In inter-
trial priming, recently selected stimuli are more rapidly identified as targets and are more 
slowly rejected as distractors. Recent evidence shows that inter-trial priming is modulated 
by the extent to which the selection of a stimulus was recently rewarded. 
 In the first study to assess reward-modulated priming, Della Libera and Chelazzi 
(2006, Experiment 1) employed a global-local number identification task pioneered by 
Navon (1977). Participants were shown a large number (global feature) comprised of 
identical smaller numbers (local features) on a given trial (e.g., a large 7 made up of small 
2's), and were cued in advance which feature to perform an identity judgment on. 
Participants were randomly given a high or low monetary reward for correctly identifying 
the cued feature. These were referred to as prime trials, each of which was followed by an 
unrewarded probe trial on which only one of the two features could be mapped onto a 
response (e.g., a large 6 made up of small X’s). Following a high reward, response time was 
faster on probe trials when the judgment from the prime trial was repeated and slower 
when the judgment switched, consistent with inter-trial priming of the rewarded feature. 
This pattern was reversed, however, following the receipt of a low reward, suggesting that 
participants were biased against repeating the same judgment in this case. A follow-up 
experiment reported the same reward-dependent pattern of priming when the color of 
stimuli was primed in an object discrimination task (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006, 
Experiment 2). 
 In another important study on reward-modulated priming, Hickey, Chelazzi, and 
Theeuwes (2010a) employed a paradigm in which participants performed visual search for 




nontarget shapes was presented in a unique color, which served as a physically salient 
singleton distractor (e.g., a red shape among green shapes). Participants were randomly 
given a high or low reward for correctly identifying the shape singleton target on a given 
trial. Critically, the color of the target and distractor could either be repeated or swapped on 
the subsequent trial, allowing for the assessment of inter-trial priming of color and its 
relation to prior reward. The results were very similar to those reported by Della Libera and 
Chelazzi (2006) in that priming was again dependent on reward feedback—large priming 
effects were observed following high reward that were reversed or eliminated following 
low reward. The magnitude of the extent to which reward modulated priming in this way 
was well predicted by reward-evoked activity in anterior cingulate cortex (Hickey et al., 
2010a). 
 A follow-up study revealed that the magnitude of reward-modulated priming across 
individuals is positively correlated with individual reports of the extent to which reward 
motivates behavior (Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010b). Thus, individuals who are the 
most motivated by rewards are also the most influenced by recent reward history in visual 
search. Reward modulated priming was also shown to be specific to stimuli whose selection 
as a target was associated with reward (Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2011) and is evident 
in eye movement trajectories in addition to covert attention allocation (Hickey & van Zoest, 
2012). 
 Accounts of attentional control have been forwarded that explain distractor 
suppression in terms of an individual's motivation to suppress visual features (e.g., Geyer, 
Müller, & Krummenacher, 2008; Moher, Abrams, Egeth, Yantis, & Stuphorn, 2011; Müller, 
Geyer, Zehetleitner, & Krummenacher, 2009). One possible account of reward-modulated 
priming is that reward feedback dynamically adjusts an individual's incentive to suppress 




as a function of prior reward. There are several aspects of reward-modulated priming that 
suggest it is to some degree independent of such voluntary influences on attention. Reward-
modulated priming occurs despite the fact that the rewards are completely unrelated to 
task performance, a design element that participants are informed of (Hickey et al., 2010a, 
2010b, 2011). Furthermore, reward-modulated priming persists even when observers are 
provided with direct incentive to search for the non-primed feature on the following trial 
(Hickey et al., 2010a), suggesting that reward-modulated priming is resistant to 
countermanding goal-driven attentional control. Brain circuits involved in reward 
processing and incentive motivation are believed to be interrelated (e.g., Berridge, 2012; 
Berridge & Robinson, 1998); this suggests that the experience of reward may modulate the 
incentive salience of a stimulus in an automatic fashion. 
3. Exploring the Role of Reward History in Involuntary Attentional Selection 
 An important prediction of the framework I have proposed is that the learned value 
of a stimulus should bias attentional selection independently of the physical salience and 
goal-relevance of the stimulus, such that previously reward-associated stimuli compete for 
selection even when nonsalient and task-irrelevant. Up to this point, the extent to which 
attentional priority is modulated specifically by learned stimulus–reward associations is 
unclear. The receipt of reward clearly modulates stimulus priming, but such an effect 
cannot be attributed to a learned association. In reward-modulated priming, attentional 
priority is biased by the actual receipt of reward (Hickey et al., 2010a), such that the 
attentional priority of reward-related stimuli constantly fluctuates based on their most 
recent reward history (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006; Hickey et al., 2010a, 2010b, 2011).  
Although the effects of stimulus–reward associations on search efficiency are 
consistent with a direct and involuntary effect of learned value on selection, they may also 




attention. Attending to reward-related stimuli and procuring rewards often represent 
explicit goals of the task in studies on reward and attention (Maunsell, 2004). Indeed, in all 
of the aforementioned studies on how reward modulates selection in visual search, the 
reward-associated stimuli (1) could appear as a sought target or otherwise provided 
information about the target and/or (2) could appear when performance was still 
motivated by currently available rewards. One possibility, then, is that the influence of 
learned stimulus–reward associations on attentional priority is subsumed entirely within 
the domain of voluntary, goal-driven attentional control. In this sense, reward merely acts 
to strengthen goal-directed attentional control through mechanisms of motivation. By such 
an account, learned stimulus–reward associations have no specific role in modulating 
attentional priority. 
 In the chapters that follow, I present experiments that directly assess the role of 
learned stimulus–reward associations in involuntarily driving attentional selection. In this 
series of studies, I tested whether stimuli that have been previously associated with reward 
through learning involuntarily capture attention even when entirely task-irrelevant and 
when rewards are no longer available. That is, I compared the attentional priority of 
irrelevant stimuli that differed only in their prior history with reward. The results indicate a 
uniquely value-driven mechanism of attentional control that functions independently of 





Chapter II: Salience-driven Attentional Capture is Modulated by Reward History 
Material from this chapter was originally published in:  
Anderson, B. A., Laurent, P. A., & Yantis, S. (2011a). Learned value modulates 
stimulus-driven attentional capture. PLoS ONE, 6(11), e27926. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027926. 
Anderson, B. A., Laurent, P. A., & Yantis, S. (2011b). Value-driven attentional capture. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 108, 10367-10371. 
 
 Effective deployment of attention is critical to the successful performance of any 
cognitive task. Attention determines what aspects of the sensory input are selected for 
cognitive processing, memory storage, and awareness. Two modes of attentional control are 
widely believed to determine perceptual priority: a voluntary, goal-directed mode, in which 
attention is guided by contextually appropriate goals and intentions, and an involuntary, 
stimulus-driven mode, in which attention is captured by physically salient stimuli (Corbetta 
& Shulman, 2002; Itti & Koch, 2001; Theeuwes, 1992, 2010) or by task-irrelevant stimuli 
that share identifying features with a searched-for target (Anderson & Folk, 2010; Folk et 
al., 1992). Each of these modes of control present concomitant benefits and costs: voluntary 
control of attention is goal-specific but potentially slower to implement; involuntary 
attentional capture can rapidly orient the organism to unexpected changes that could signal 
danger or opportunity, but has the potential to cause distraction from intended acts of 
perception. 
 Goal-directed and stimulus-driven modes of attentional control have long been a 
focus of intense investigation, and much has been learned about the operating principles of 
each mode of control and their interaction (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Theeuwes, 2010). 
However, there is growing evidence that these are not the only influences on attentional 
deployment. To promote survival and wellbeing, the brain is optimized to learn about 
perceptual stimuli that signal the potential for procuring reward (Shuler & Bear, 2006; Seitz 




for efficiently selecting valuable stimuli (Maunsell, 2004). Many studies have shown that 
reward facilitates voluntary attention to task-relevant stimuli, and that reward-based 
strategies and priorities strongly influence attentional performance (Della Libera & 
Chelazzi, 2006, 2009; Hickey et al., 2010a, 2010b, 2011; Krebs et al., 2010; Navalpakkam et 
al., 2010; Peck et al., 2009; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010; Raymond & O'Brien, 2009; Serences, 
2008; Serences & Saproo, 2010).  
 Attentional capture by valuable but task-irrelevant stimuli could also confer 
adaptive advantages in many circumstances, leading the perceiver to orient to 
inconspicuous and/or unexpected reward-related stimuli. At the same time, however, 
attentional capture by reward-related stimuli (e.g., drugs of abuse, excessive food, or even 
irrelevant but rewarding information like an email chime) can be maladaptive when it 
conflicts with contextually appropriate goals (e.g., intended abstinence from a drug or food) 
(Bush, 2010; Davis, 2010; Field & Cox, 2008; Garavan & Hester, 2007; Robinson & Berridge, 
2008). This raises the possibility that valuable stimuli capture attention involuntarily as a 
consequence of reward learning. In this chapter, I provide the first test of the hypothesis 
that learned value automatically guides attentional selection.  
1. Experiment 1 
 Human participants first learned stimulus–reward associations in a training phase 
involving visual search for color-defined stimuli (Figure 1a); correct responses in target 
identification were followed by monetary reward feedback, and one target color was 
associated with a larger reward than the other on average. Immediately following the 
training phase, participants completed a test phase in which color was irrelevant to the task 
and previously reward-associated color stimuli were occasionally presented as task-
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Figure 1. Sequence and time course of trial events. (A) Targets during the training phase were defined by color 
(red or green, exactly one of which was present on each trial), and participants reported the identity of the line 
segment inside of the target (vertical or horizontal) with a key press. Correct responses were followed by the 
delivery of monetary reward feedback. One of the target colors was followed by a high reward on 80% of the 
trials and a low reward on 20% of the trials; for the other target color, this mapping was reversed. (B) During 
the test phase, the target was defined as the unique shape, and no reward feedback was provided. On half of the 
trials, one of the non-target items—the distractor—was rendered in the color of a formerly rewarded target 
(each color equally often). 
 
 The distractors in the test phase were physically salient color singletons, which are 
known to robustly capture attention as a consequence of their feature contrast when the 
target is also salient (e.g., Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Theeuwes, 1992, 2010). My primary focus 
here was to determine whether a salient high-value distractor would capture attention 
more robustly than a salient low-value distractor. If learned value has no automatic 
influence on attention, then high- and low-value color singletons should produce similar 
slowing in visual search. If learned value combines with physical salience in the guidance of 
attention, then the formerly high-reward distractors should slow responses more than 
formerly low-reward distractors. 
1.1. Methods 
 1.1.1. Participants. Eighteen participants were recruited from the Johns Hopkins 
University community. All were screened for normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity 
and color vision. Participants were provided monetary compensation that varied between 




an informed consent form prior to participating in the experiments. The study was 
approved by the Johns Hopkins University Institutional Review Board. 
 1.1.2. Apparatus and Stimuli. A Mac Mini equipped with Matlab software and 
Psychophysics Toolbox extensions was used to present the stimuli on a Dell P991 monitor. 
The participants viewed the monitor from a distance of approximately 50 cm in a dimly lit 
room. 
 The sequence of events and time course for the training and test phases are shown 
in Figure 1a and 1b, respectively. Each trial consisted of three displays: a fixation display, a 
search display, and a feedback display. During both the training and test phases, the fixation 
display consisted of a white fixation cross (.5° x .5° visual angle) presented in the center of 
the screen against a black background, and the search display consisted of the fixation cross 
surrounded by six shapes (2.3° x 2.3° visual angle) placed at equal intervals along an 
imaginary circle with a 5° radius.  
 1.1.2.1. Training Phase. During the training phase, the six shapes that comprised the 
search display were all circles of different colors (red, green, blue, cyan, pink, orange, 
yellow, and white). Targets were defined as either a red or green circle, one of which was 
presented on every trial in a randomly-selected location. Inside the target shape, a white 
line segment was oriented either vertically or horizontally, and inside each of the nontarget 
shapes, a white line segment was tilted at 45° to the left or to the right. The feedback display 
informed participants of the reward earned on the current trial, as well as total reward 
accumulated thus far. 
 1.1.2.2. Test Phase. During the test phase, the search display consisted of a white 
circle among white diamonds or a white diamond among white circles, and the target on 
each trial was defined as the unique shape. On a randomly-selected half of the trials, one of 




feedback display at test only informed participants whether their response on the current 
trial was correct. 
1.1.3. Design 
 The experiment consisted of a single session of 1008 training trials followed by 480 
test trials. Participants were provided with 50 practice trials prior to the training phase, and 
20 practice trials prior to the test phase. After every 100 trials and between the two phases, 
participants were provided with a short break. Target identity, target location, distractor 
color, and distractor location were fully crossed and counterbalanced, and trials were 
presented in a random order. 
 Correct responses in the training phase were followed by visual feedback indicating 
monetary reward. High-reward targets were followed by high-reward feedback (5¢) on 
80% of trials and low-reward feedback (1¢) on the remaining 20%; for low-reward targets, 
the percentages were reversed. High-reward targets were red for half of the participants, 
and green for the other half. No reward feedback was provided during the initial practice 
block, and no reward feedback was provided during the test phase. Upon completion of the 
experiment, participants were given the cumulative reward they had earned. 
1.1.4. Procedure 
 Each participant performed the experiment individually over the course of a single 
two-hour session. Each session took place inside a dimly lit laboratory room. The 
experimenter familiarized all participants with each task by providing written and oral 
descriptions of the stimuli and procedures. Participants were instructed to respond "as 
quickly as possible while minimizing errors." 
 Each trial began with the presentation of the fixation display for a randomly varying 
interval of 400, 500, or 600 ms. The search display then appeared and remained on screen 




time pressure, with trials terminating after 600 ms; during test, time pressure was lifted by 
lengthening this time limit to 1500 ms. 
 Participants made a forced-choice target identification by pressing the "z" key when 
the line inside the target was oriented vertically and the "m" key when the line inside the 
target was oriented horizontally. Response time (RT) was measured from the onset of the 
target display until a response was made or the trial timed out. The computer emitted a 500 
ms 1000 Hz feedback tone to inform the participant when a trial timed out. Only correct 
responses were included in the analysis, and all RTs more than three standard deviations 
above and below the mean of their respective conditions were excluded from the analysis.   
1.2. Results and Discussion 
 During training, mean RT to high- and low-reward targets did not differ 
significantly, although there was a trend toward faster responses to the target color 
associated with high reward, suggesting increased attentional priority, mean difference = 
3.4 ms, t(17) = 1.57, p = .135. To assess how the effect of reward on target selection changed 
over the course of the training phase, I analyzed the data from the training phase separately 
in ten bins of roughly 100 trials each. There was no interaction between reward and trial 
bin, F(9,153) = 1.43, p = .179, indicating that the influence of reward on RT did not change 
significantly over time. The main effect of trial bin was significant, F(9,153) = 4.92, p < .001, 
  
 = .224, however, showing that participants generally responded faster with more 





Figure 2. Mean response time + within-subjects s.e.m. for high- and low-reward targets over the course of the 
1008 trials of the training phase. 
  
Of particular interest were the data from the test phase. Reward-color mapping (i.e., 
red vs. green as the high-reward color in the training phase) did not interact with the effect 
of value on performance in the test phase, F < 1, so further analyses collapsed across color. 
Response times (RTs) in the test phase differed significantly in the three distractor 
conditions, F(2,34) = 48.57, p < .001,   
  = .741 (Figure 3). Planned comparisons confirmed 
that both the high-value and low-value distractors slowed RT compared to when no 
distractor was presented, t(17) = 8.45, p < .001, d = 1.99, and t(17) = 6.31, p < .001, d = 1.47, 
respectively. This replicates many previous demonstrations of attentional capture by 
irrelevant but physically salient feature singletons (e.g., Theeuwes, 1992, 2010).  
 
Figure 3. Mean response time + within-subjects s.e.m. for each distractor condition over the course of the test 
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 I next examined the effect of reward history on performance in the test phase. High-
value distractors slowed RT significantly more than did low-value distractors, t(17) = 3.37, 
p = .004,  d = .81. This modulation of attentional capture by reward history cannot be 
attributed to differences in physical salience, and occurred despite the irrelevance of the 
color items to the shape-search task. To assess how the effect of reward history on 
attentional capture changed over the course of the test phase, I analyzed the data from the 
test phase separately in four equally-sized 120-trial bins. The effect of learned value on 
performance gradually extinguished over the course of the unrewarded test trials, as 
revealed by a linear trend in the difference between RTs for high- and low-value distractor 
trials over trial bin, F(1,17) = 17.22, p = .001,   
  = .503. There was no significant difference 
in error rates between the three distractor conditions, F < 1 (Table 1). 
Table 1. Response times (in milliseconds) and error rates by distractor condition for Experiments 1 and 2. Error 
terms, in parentheses, reflect the within-subjects s.e.m. 
 
Distractor Condition in  
Experiment 1 
Distractor Condition in  
Experiment 2 
None Low-Value High-Value  None Non-Target Colored Target Colored 
655(5.5) 710(3.9) 728(3.8)  588(3.6) 632(4.1) 634(4.8) 
.09(.003) .10(.004) .10(.005)  .11(.003) .13(.005) .13(.005) 
  
 These results reveal that learned value magnifies attentional capture by salient 
stimuli. As the learned stimulus-value associations extinguished in the absence of reward, 
so did the effect of reward history on performance. However, extinction occurred gradually 
over many trials, resulting in a robust effect of prior reward on involuntary attention 
allocation for the first several hundred trials of the test phase. Taken together, these results 
provide strong evidence that learned value can magnify the effect of physical salience on 
attentional priority.  




 Despite the fact that attentional capture in Experiment 1 was significantly 
modulated by value, it could be that the effect of value on salience-based attentional capture 
was not critically dependent upon a learned association between stimuli and prior reward. 
Instead, it is possible that participants continued to maintain a search set for the training-
phase target colors, and particularly for the previously high-reward color, even in the test 
phase. Although it is known that participants can rapidly adjust task-related attentional 
priorities with changing task demands (Anderson & Folk, 2012a, 2014; Lien, Ruthruff, & 
Johnston, 2010), former targets can continue to draw attention under certain conditions 
(Kyllingbaek, Schneider, & Bundesen, 2001; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Thus, it is 
important to rule out this possible explanation of my results. 
 I tested eighteen new participants who engaged in a training phase that was similar 
to that used in Experiment 1, with two critical differences. First, no reward feedback was 
provided during training or at any point during the experiment; instead, participants were 
compensated with a flat rate that matched the average earnings of participants in the main 
experiment ($25). Second, targets were now either red or blue (with green occurring as one 
of the nontargets) for half of the participants, and green or blue (with red occurring as one 
of the nontargets) for the other participants. The test phase for all participants was identical 
to that of Experiment 1. Thus, in the test phase, one color-singleton distractor had been a 
target color during the training phase, and the other color-singleton distractor had always 
been a nontarget color. If persisting priority for a former target color alone drove the main 
findings from Experiment 1, we would expect an equally large—or indeed even larger—
difference in RT on trials containing the color distractor that was used as a target during 






 2.1.1. Participants. Eighteen new participants were recruited from the Johns Hopkins 
University community. All were screened for normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity 
and color vision. Participants were compensated with $25. 
 2.1.2. Apparatus and Stimuli. The apparatus and stimuli were identical to Experiment 
1 with the following exceptions. Targets during training were either a blue or green circle 
(for half of the participants), or a blue or red circle. On half of the trials containing each 
target color, one of the nontarget-colored items was colored either red (for participants 
searching for green and blue targets) or green (for participants searching for red and blue 
targets). The feedback display during training only informed participants whether their 
previous response was correct. 
 2.1.3. Design and Procedure. The design and procedure were identical to Experiment 
1, with the exception that no monetary reward feedback was provided. 
2.2. Results and Discussion 
 Distractors at test were classified as being either the color of a former target or the 
color of a former nontarget. During the test phase, responses were significantly slowed by 
both former target-colored and former nontarget-colored distractors, t(17) = 7.27, p < .001, 
d = 1.71, and t(17) = 6.13, p < .001, d = 1.44, respectively (Figure 4). However, I observed no 
difference in RT between those two distractor conditions, t(17) = 0.34, p = .740 (Table 1). 
The magnitude of slowing caused by the former target color distractors did not decrease 
over the course of the test phase, F < 1, in contrast to Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, 
there was no significant difference in error rates among the three conditions, F(2,34) = 2.20, 





Figure 4. Mean response time + within-subjects s.e.m. for each distractor condition over the course of the test 
phase of Experiment 2. 
 
 The slowing caused by the high-value distractor in Experiment 1 was significantly 
greater than that caused by the former target-colored distractor in Experiment 2, mean 
difference = 27 ms, t(34) = 2.29, p = .025, d = .79. The low-value distractor in Experiment 1 
also produced a greater degree of slowing than the former target-colored distractor in 
Experiment 2, although this difference was not significant, mean difference = 9 ms, t(34) = 
0.80, p = .428. This outcome demonstrates that value associations are necessary to produce 
the modulation of distraction observed in Experiment 1, and that this modulation cannot be 
explained merely in terms of a persisting intention to search for former targets. 
3. Summary and General Discussion 
 It is well established that physical salience and ongoing task goals influence 
attentional priority involuntarily (e.g., Folk et al., 1992; Theeuwes, 1992). Although 
salience-based and contingency-based mechanisms of attentional control are known to 
jointly influence attentional priority, it was unknown whether attentional priority can be 
modulated by learned value. In this chapter, I show that the physical salience and learned 
value of a stimulus have a combined effect on attentional priority, with learned value 
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 My results demonstrate that a salient but otherwise neutral stimulus, when 
previously associated with high reward, magnifies distraction even after that stimulus no 
longer predicts reward. This finding cannot be attributed to differences in physical salience, 
and Experiment 2 rules out persisting intention to search for a former target as an 
explanation. The findings provide the first evidence that the learned value of visual stimuli 






Chapter III: Attentional Capture Driven by Learned Value 
Material from this chapter was originally published in:  
Anderson, B. A., Laurent, P. A., & Yantis, S. (2011b). Value-driven attentional capture. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 108, 10367-10371. 
 
 Chapter II showed that physically salient stimuli previously associated with high 
reward capture attention more robustly than equally salient stimuli previously associated 
with a comparatively smaller amount of reward. There are multiple mechanisms through 
which value and salience might be combined in order to jointly determine attentional 
priority in this way. One is that learned value directly modulates the visual salience or 
pertinence (Bundesen, 1990) of reward-associated stimulus features, thereby increasing 
their attentional priority. This possibility is supported by evidence showing that reward-
associated stimulus features are represented more robustly in early visual areas of the 
brain (Serences, 2008; Serences & Saproo, 2010). Furthermore, Navalpakkam and 
colleagues (2010) showed that attentional selection can reflect an optimal weighting of the 
conspicuity of a stimulus afforded by its physical salience and its current reward value, 
suggesting that value-based and salience-based attentional priority can be independently 
adjusted. Another possibility is that the learned value of stimuli increases attentional dwell 
time—that is, the time required to disengage attention after it has been captured by the 
physical salience of the stimulus (Belopolsky et al., 2010; Duncan, Ward, & Shapiro, 1994; 
Theeuwes, 2010). By this latter account, the learned value of a stimulus does not influence 
attention at the level of selection but rather at the level of post-selection processing.  
 In this Chapter, I examine whether an irrelevant and nonsalient distractor, 
previously associated with reward, captures attention when both stimulus-driven and goal-
driven accounts predict that a physically salient and task-relevant target should instead 
solely determine the locus of attention. Attentional capture by stimuli previously associated 




uniquely value-driven, such that learned value has a direct role in biasing attention as 
hypothesized in Chapter I. 
1. Experiment 3 
 Experiment 3 mirrored Experiment 1 with the critical difference being that during 
the test phase, all of the stimuli were differently colored as in the training phase, making the 
previously reward-associated color nonsalient (one of six colors in the display rather than a 
color singleton, see Figure 5). Under these conditions, both goal-directed and salience-
driven attention mechanisms should bias attention in favor of the target (which is a 
physically salient shape singleton; see, e.g., Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Theeuwes, 1992, 2010). 
Attentional capture by the previously reward-associated distractor here would be uniquely 
consistent with a value-driven mechanism of attentional selection that operates 
independently of goal-directed and salience-driven mechanisms. 
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Figure 5. Sequence of events and time course for a trial during training (a) and at test (b) in Experiment 3.  
 
1.1. Methods 
 1.1.1. Participants. Twenty-six new participants were recruited from the Johns 
Hopkins community. All were screened for normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and 
color vision. Participants were provided monetary compensation based on performance 




experimental procedures were approved by the Johns Hopkins University Institutional 
Review Board. 
 1.1.2. Apparatus and Stimuli. The apparatus and stimuli were identical to that of 
Experiment 1 with the exception that in the test phase, each item had a unique color. The 
same colors were used as during training: on distractor-present trials, either red or green 
(equally-often) replaced one of the nontarget colors. 
 1.1.3. Design and Procedure. The design and procedure were identical to that of 
Experiment 1.  
1.2. Results and Discussion 
Based on the reward contingencies to which participants were exposed during the 
training phase, trials during the test phase were classified as containing a high-value 
distractor, a low-value distractor, or neither. A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed that 
RTs differed significantly among these three conditions, F(2,50) = 6.07, p = .004 (Figure 6). 
High-value distractors slowed RT relative to when neither value-related distractor was 
present, t(25) = 3.49, p = .002. There was no significant difference in accuracy between the 
three distractor conditions, F(2,50) = 0.41, p = .667 (absent: 89.4%, low-value: 89.8%, high-
value: 89.2%). These results are striking in that they clearly violate the predictions of both a 
salience-driven and goal-driven account of attentional capture: the data mirror the well-
documented distracting effect of physically salient stimuli (Theeuwes, 1992, 2010; 
Theeuwes & Godijn, 2002), despite the fact that the distractors were neither physically 
salient nor goal-relevant, and did not have any identifying features in common with the 
searched-for target (Folk et al., 1992). Even the fastest 25% of RTs in the high-value 
distractor condition were slower than those in the distractor absent condition, t(25) = 3.07, 
p = .005, suggesting that the high-value distractor captured attention consistently, rather 
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Figure 6. Mean response time + within-subjects s.e.m. for each distractor condition in the test phase of 
Experiment 3. 
 
2. Experiment 4 
 As in Chapter II, I sought to provide evidence that the observed attentional capture 
by a previously reward-associated stimulus is distinctly reward-driven and cannot be 
explained by a more general attentional bias for former target colors (Kyllingbaek et al., 
2001; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Therefore, I tested a different set of participants who 
engaged in the same training and testing phases of Experiment 3, but with no reward 
feedback during training. Instead, participants were compensated with a flat rate that 
matched the average earnings of participants in the main experiment ($25). If the 
attentional capture observed in Experiment 3 is value-driven, we should see no evidence of 
capture by equally-familiar former target colors that were never associated with reward 
feedback (i.e., following equally long training in which the reward feedback is omitted). 
2.1. Methods 
 2.1.1. Participants. Ten new participants were recruited from the Johns Hopkins 
community. All were screened for normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and color 
vision. Participants were compensated with a flat amount of $25.  
 2.1.2. Apparatus and Stimuli. The apparatus and stimuli were identical to Experiment 
3, with the exception that the feedback display during training only informed participants 




 2.1.3. Design and Procedure. The design and procedure were identical to Experiment 
3, with the exception that no monetary rewards were provided for correct responses.  
2.2. Results and Discussion 
 Removing trial-by-trial reward feedback from the training phase completely 
abolished any effect of the former target color distractors at test, t(9) = -0.39, p = .707 
(absent: 602 ms, red: 606 ms, green: 593 ms). Nor was there a significant difference in 
accuracy between the red, green, and no-distractor conditions, F(2,18) = 2.30, p = .139 
(absent: 85.9%, red: 83.1%, green: 84.4%). These findings provide converging evidence that 
reward outcomes bias attention to select stimuli that are associated with those outcomes. 
3. Summary and General Discussion 
 The experiments in this Chapter establish that nonsalient, task-irrelevant stimuli 
previously associated with reward interfere with visual search during extinction. This result 
strongly suggests that reward history is alone sufficient to automatically guide attentional 
selection, independently of the well-established roles of task-specific goals (e.g., Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002; Folk et al., 1992) and physical salience (e.g., Itti & Koch, 2001; Theeuwes, 
1992, 2010) in the guidance of attention. A control experiment confirmed that the observed 
attentional capture was attributable to reward feedback during training, ruling out the 
persistence of a deliberate attentional strategy as an explanation; this confirms evidence 
that top-down goals in visual search can be adjusted flexibly within seconds (Anderson & 
Folk, 2012a, 2014; Lien, Ruthruff, & Johnston, 2010), and further distinguishes value-driven 
capture from goal-directed attentional deployment. 
 In a classic investigation of attentional control, Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) 
reported that following extensive training in search for a specific target letter, that letter 
subsequently captures attention even when it is no longer task-relevant. However, this 




driven attentional capture reported here required substantially less training. Furthermore, 
if reward was omitted during training, the effect disappeared. Value-driven attentional 
capture is clearly a distinct phenomenon.  
 The findings reported here provide clear evidence that arbitrary stimuli capture 
attention involuntarily and persistently as a result of learned associations with reward 
outcome. Unlike in Chapter II, the distraction caused by previously reward-associated 
stimuli cannot be explained as resulting from attentional orienting based on physical 
salience. Because the target was the most physically salient stimulus in these experiments 
and was currently goal-relevant, it is clear that value-driven attention is not only 
independent of salience-driven and goal-directed attention but is also capable of out-
competing these attention mechanisms under certain conditions, having a powerful and 
automatic influence on visual processing. 






Chapter IV: Spatial Specificity of Value-driven Attentional Capture 
Material from this chapter was originally published in:  
Anderson, B. A., Laurent, P. A., & Yantis, S. (2011b). Value-driven attentional capture. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 108, 10367-10371. 
Anderson, B. A., & Yantis, S. (2012). Value-driven attentional and oculomotor 
capture during goal-directed, unconstrained viewing. Attention, Perception, 
and Psychophysics, 74, 1644-1653. 
 
 Chapter III showed that stimuli previously associated with reward involuntarily 
slow response time in target identification, consistent with value-driven attentional capture. 
The same logic has been used to argue for attentional capture by physically salient stimuli 
(e.g., Theeuwes, 1992, 1994). However, such slowing can also be explained by non-spatial 
distraction that does not necessarily involve attentional selection. For example, ignoring 
physically salient stimuli can entail a non-spatial slowing of visual processing referred to as 
a filtering cost (Treisman, Kahneman, & Burkell, 1983). It is also possible that the presence 
of previously reward-associated distractors elicits an increase in arousal that interferes 
with visual processing independently of attention. Compelling evidence for attentional 
selection of the previously reward-associated stimuli would come from measures that 
demonstrate spatially-specific processing of the distractor location. 
 Two specially-specific markers of attentional processing that have been used to 
argue in favor of attentional capture by both physically salient stimuli and goal-relevant 
stimuli (i.e., contingent capture: Folk et al., 1992) are inhibition of return (e.g., Pratt & 
McAuliffe, 2002; Theeuwes & Godijn, 2002) and oculomotor capture (e.g., Ludwig & 
Gilchrist, 2002, 2003; Theeuwes et al., 2003). In Experiments 5 and 6, I provide parallel 
evidence for value-driven attentional capture using these same measures. 
1. Experiment 5 
 When attention is withdrawn from a stimulus, subsequent inhibition of the formerly 




patterns (Posner, Rafal, Choate, & Vaughan, 1985). Such inhibition is referred to as 
inhibition of return (IOR). If the slowing of response time observed in Chapters II and III is 
indeed a consequence of spatially-specific attentional selection of the distractor, IOR should 
result from the need to shift attention from the distractor location to the target location in 
order to perform the target identification task. In a rapid-trial design such as the one I have 
employed, IOR should be detectable on the subsequent trial if present. This would manifest 
as a slowing of response time on trials in which the target appears in the location occupied 
by a distractor on the prior trial, as processing of the target location would be affected by 
IOR. Using this logic, I explicitly tested for evidence of IOR using a similar experimental 
design to Experiment 3. To further extend the findings of that prior experiment and 
investigate the robustness of value-driven attentional capture, I also employed a 
considerably shorter training phase (240 vs. 1008 trials) to see whether value-driven 
attentional priority is evident following a brief training procedure. 
1.1. Methods  
 1.1.1. Participants. Twenty-four new participants were recruited from the Johns 
Hopkins community. All were screened for normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and 
color vision. Participants were provided monetary compensation based on performance 
(mean = $13.24). 
 1.1.2. Apparatus and Stimuli. The apparatus and stimuli were identical to Experiment 
3.  
 1.1.3. Design and Procedure. The design and procedure were identical to Experiment 
3, with the following exceptions. The experiment consisted of a single one-hour session. The 
training and test phases consisted of 240 trials each, with a short break every 120 trials. 
Trials terminated after 800 ms in the training phase and 1200 ms in the test phase. High 




1.2. Results and Discussion 
 Closely replicating the critical results from Experiment 3, previously reward-
associated distractors slowed visual search in the test phase, despite the shorter training, 
repeated-measures ANOVA: F(2,46) = 5.17, p = .009 (Figure 7). Next, I tested whether value-
driven attentional capture produces IOR, which would be consistent with spatially-specific 
processing of the distractor location. To this end, I examined RTs in trials on which no 
distractor was presented that were preceded by a trial containing a high-value distractor. 
Responses were on average 66 ms slower when the target appeared in a location formerly 
occupied by a high-value distractor than when it appeared in another location, t(23) = 3.13, 
p = .005, confirming that high-value distractors indeed capture attention in a spatially 
specific manner. The magnitude of this location-specific interference was somewhat larger 
than typical demonstrations of IOR (e.g., Posner et al., 1985), suggesting potential 
differences in the underlying mechanism that are specific to reward-based processing. In 
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Figure 7. Mean response time + within-subjects s.e.m. for each distractor condition in the test phase of 
Experiment 5. 
 
2. Experiment 6 
 Shifts of covert attention precede and direct overt eye movements (e.g., Deubel & 
Schneider, 1996; Hoffman & Subramaniam, 1995), such that eye movements occur to the 




can be spatially attended without a resultant eye movement toward that stimulus, an eye 
movement toward a stimulus cannot be generated without first attending to that stimulus 
in a spatially-specific manner (e.g., Thompson & Bichot, 2005). Compelling evidence for 
spatially-specific attentional capture by previously reward-associated stimuli would be 
found if participants were to direct eye movements toward such stimuli even though they 
are entirely irrelevant to the current task and physically nonsalient. In Experiment 6, 
participants performed a similar task to the prior experiment with eye position monitored. 
2.1. Methods 
 2.1.1. Participants. Fifteen new participants were recruited from the Johns Hopkins 
University community. All were screened for normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity 
and color vision. Participants were provided monetary compensation based on 
performance that ranged from $23 to $27 (mean = $25.53). Eye position could not be 
calibrated for one participant, so all eye tracking results include fourteen participants. 
 2.1.2. Apparatus. A Mac Mini equipped with Matlab software and Psychophysics 
Toolbox extensions was used to present the stimuli on a Dell P991 monitor. The 
participants viewed the monitor from a distance of 75 cm in a dimly lit room, using a chin 
rest. Manual responses were entered by participants using a standard 101-key US layout 
keyboard. Eye tracking and pupillometry were performed using an EyeLink 1000 system. 
 2.1.3. Experimental Task.  
 2.1.3.1. Training phase. The sequence and timing of events in the training phase is 
shown in Figure 8a. Each trial consisted of a fixation display for 2000 ms, a search display 
for 1000 ms, a blank screen for either 1000 or 3000 ms (equally often), a reward feedback 
display for 1500 ms, and a blank inter-trial interval for 500, 2500, or 4500 ms 
(exponentially distributed with 500 ms occurring most often). Targets in the training phase 




orange, yellow, or white); exactly one target was present on each trial. The six circles were 
2.5° visual angle in diameter, and were placed 6.0° center-to-center from fixation. The 
training phase consisted of 5 blocks of 60 trials in which each target color appeared in each 
of the six stimulus positions equally often across trials. Participants reported whether an 
oriented bar within the target stimulus was either vertical or horizontal by pressing the "z" 
and "m" keys, respectively. Correct responses were followed by monetary reward feedback, 
which varied probabilistically with the color of the target. One target color was associated 
with an 80% probability of a high reward of 15¢ and a 20% probability of a low reward of 
3¢; for the other target color, this mapping was reversed. Training thus imbued one color 
with high value and the other with lower (but positive) value. Half of the participants 
experienced red as the high-reward target and green as the low-reward target, and for the 
other half this mapping was reversed. If participants responded incorrectly, the feedback 
display informed them that they had received 0¢. The cumulative reward earned thus far 
was also displayed after each trial. 
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Figure 8. Sequence of events and time course for a trial during training (a) and at test (b) in Experiment 6. 
  
2.1.3.2. Test phase. The sequence and timing of events in the test phase is shown in 




ms, and a blank inter-trial interval for 500, 2500, or 4500 ms (exponentially distributed 
with 500 ms occurring most often). Targets in the test phase were now defined as the 
unique shape, either a circle among diamonds or a diamond among circles (equally often 
and randomly ordered). Participants made the same judgment concerning the oriented bar 
contained within the target stimulus. The search items were differently colored, as in the 
training phase; however, the targets were never red or green. On a randomly-selected one-
quarter of the trials, one of the nontarget items was rendered in red and on another one-
quarter, one of the nontarget items was rendered in green—these constituted the formerly 
rewarded distractors (the remaining items will be referred to as nontargets). The test phase 
consisted of 4 blocks of 80 trials in which the target appeared in each of the six stimulus 
positions with equal probability. When a distractor was present, it appeared in each of the 
five nontarget positions with equal probability. No monetary feedback was provided in the 
test phase; participants were informed of their accuracy for each block following the 
completion of that block. 
 2.1.4. Instructions. Throughout the experiment, participants were encouraged to 
respond with a button press as quickly as possible while minimizing errors. Participants 
were instructed to ignore color during the test phase, and to focus on identifying the line 
orientation within the unique shape. They were provided written and verbal descriptions of 
the task and procedures prior to each phase of the experiment, and were shown example 
displays. Participants were neither encouraged nor discouraged from moving their eyes; all 
they were told was that their eyes would be monitored during the task using a camera. 
 2.1.5. Eye Tracking. Eye tracking was performed at a sampling rate of 500 Hz. Nine-
point calibration was used. Calibration was checked at the beginning of each block and 
recalibrated as necessary. Head position was maintained using a chin rest, and eye position 




defined as those for which velocity exceeded 30°/sec and acceleration exceeded 8000°/sec. 
The first eye movement for each search display was measured as the first saccade exceeding 
one degree visual angle that occurred at least 100 ms following the onset of the search 
array.  
 2.1.6. Data Analysis. Manual RTs on error trials and RTs more than three standard 
deviations above or below the mean of their respective conditions for each participant were 
excluded from the RT analysis (together this resulted in the removal of 6.5% of the trials). 
Saccades occurring less than 100 ms following the onset of the search array were 
considered anticipations and were not included in the eye movement analysis; this resulted 
in the removal of less than 1% of all initial saccades. Blinks were eliminated by trimming 
samples spanning 100 ms (50 samples) both before and after the pupils were lost by the eye 
tracker. 
2.2. Results and Discussion 
 2.2.1. Manual response time and accuracy. I first examined evidence that the 
previously rewarded distractors captured covert attention in the test phase. Participants 
were significantly slower to respond to the target line orientation contained in the shape 
singleton when a high-value distractor was present compared to when no distractor was 
present, t(14) = 2.34, p = .035, d = .60 (Figure 9); the low-value distractor produced an 
intermediate degree of slowing, t(14) = 1.83, p = .088, d = .47. This replicates the response 
time slowing demonstrated in the prior experiments presented in this and earlier chapters. 
A value-driven impairment in performance was evident for the high-value distractor in 
accuracy as well, with the low-value distractor again producing an intermediate degree of 
impairment, t(14) = 3.15, p = .007, d = .81, and t(14) = 1.07, p = .302, d = .28, respectively 
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Figure 9. Mean response time + within-subjects s.e.m. for each distractor condition in the test phase of 
Experiment 6. 
 
2.2.2. Eye movements. Overall, participants moved their eyes from fixation on 88% of 
the trials in the test phase. However, there were substantial individual differences in the 
number of trials on which a saccade occurred; some participants moved their eyes on as 
many as 100% of the trials and others on as few as 63% of the trials. The occurrence of 
saccadic eye movements was generally associated with poorer task performance: 
participants who made fewer initial saccades tended to respond faster, r = .553, p = .040, 
and more accurately, r = -.571, p = .033, than those who made more frequent initial 
saccades. Across all trials, participants produced slower and less accurate manual responses 
on trials in which they moved their eyes compared to when they remained fixated, mean RT 
difference = 112 ms, t(760.9) = 14.61, p < .001, d = .58 (t-test corrected for inhomogeneity of 
variance), mean accuracy difference = 3.1%, χ2(1) = 8.31, p = .004, φ = .043, respectively. 
This outcome shows that eye movements were not required to perform the task well. 
Participants were no more likely to break fixation when a formerly rewarded distractor was 
present than when it was absent, mean difference < 1 trial, t(13) = 0.52, p = .612. 
Trials on which a saccade occurred were analyzed in order to assess how these 
movements were influenced by formerly rewarded distractors. The direction of the first 




whether it appeared on the same side of the display as the target or not (the effects 
reported below did not depend on whether the high-reward target color was red or green, 
F(4,48) = 1.06, p = .385, so further analyses collapsed across this variable). The side of the 
display to which an initial saccade was directed was influenced by the presence and relative 
location of a formerly rewarded distractor (Figure 10), as indicated by a significant ANOVA, 
F(4,52) = 11.79, p < .001,   




















































Figure 10. Percent of initial eye movements to the side of the display opposite the target by distractor condition 
in the test phase of Experiment 6. 
 
I focused my next analyses specifically on trials on which the distractor and target 
were presented on opposite sides of the visual field and thus competed for the direction of a 
saccade. Post-hoc contrasts revealed that participants were more likely to make an initial 
saccade to the side of the visual field opposite the target when a high-value distractor was 
present on that side compared to when it was absent, t(13) = 5.57, p < .001, d = 1.49, while 
the low-value distractor produced an intermediate level of such oculomotor impairment, 
t(13) = 1.87, p = .084, d = .50; this is an indication of value-driven oculomotor capture. Even 




value distractors was still evident, t(13) = 2.48, p = .028, d = .66, indicating that value-driven 
oculomotor capture was persistent. The behavioral impairment in RT caused by the 
formerly rewarded distractors was still evident when participants did not move their eyes 
to the side of the visual field containing the distractor, t(13) = 2.33, p = .037, d = .63, 
indicating that value-driven attentional capture does not necessarily result in value-driven 
oculomotor capture. However, value-driven oculomotor capture was associated with a large 
cost in RT such that responses were 80 ms slower when participants looked at the 
distractor, t(13) = 4.21, p = .001, d = 1.04, indicating that value-driven oculomotor capture 
substantially impaired performance. For trials on which the distractor and target were 
presented on the same side of the visual field, participants were also more likely to make 
their initial saccade to the side of the visual field containing the target when a high-value 
distractor or a low-value distractor was also present on that side compared to when it was 
absent, t(13) = 2.76, p = .016, d = .74, and t(13) = 3.63, p = .003, d = .97, respectively. 
In order to determine whether this measure of value-driven oculomotor capture 
reflected a spatially-specific effect of distraction, the number of initial saccades falling 
within one degree visual angle of the target, a high- or low-value distractor, and a nontarget 
stimulus was measured on distractor-present trials. The probability of looking at a 
nontarget stimulus was defined as the probability of initially fixating any nontarget stimulus 
divided by the number of nontarget stimuli present in the display (4 nontargets on 
distractor-present trials). This analysis revealed that initial fixations occurred to the target 
46% of the time, to the formerly rewarded distractor 22% of the time, and to any given 
nontarget stimulus 8% of the time. The probability of fixating a distractor was significantly 
greater than the probability of fixating any given nontarget stimulus, t(13) = 5.26, p < .001, d 
= 1.40, and this difference was evident even in the last block of trials, t(13) = 2.40, p = .032, 




previously reward-associated stimuli automatically attract eye movements, which is 
uniquely consistent with spatially-specific attentional capture by these distractors rather 
than a non-spatial explanation for their impairment in task performance. 
3. Summary and General Discussion 
 Salient and goal-related stimuli both elicit IOR (e.g., Pratt & McAuliffe, 2002; 
Theeuwes & Godijn, 2002) and oculomotor capture (e.g., Ludwig & Gilchrist, 2002, 2003; 
Theeuwes et al., 2003). Although the data from prior chapters reveal an impairment in 
target processing, as measured by a slowing of response time in target identification caused 
by a previously reward-associated stimulus, this impairment could be explained by non-
spatial forms of distraction that do not imply attention orienting, such as a filtering cost 
(Treisman et al., 1983). The present results reveal that stimuli imbued with value via 
reward learning produce IOR and draw eye movements involuntarily, even when they are 
inconspicuous, not task-relevant, and currently unrewarded. These findings provide strong 
evidence that, like physically salient and goal-relevant stimuli, previously reward-
associated stimuli capture attention in a spatially-specific manner. The findings from this 
chapter bolster the argument for a third mechanism of attentional control that is 
independent of the well-documented salience-driven and goal-directed mechanisms as 
outlined in Chapter I. 
 The findings from Experiment 6 also provide insight into automatic eye movements 
more generally. Experiment 6 demonstrates value-driven oculomotor capture even though 
eye movements were neither encouraged nor required to perform the experimental task, 
which differs from previous studies of oculomotor capture in which an eye movement to the 
target was required (Ludwig & Gilchrist, 2002, 2003; Hickey & van Zoest, 2012; Theeuwes 
et al., 2003; Van der Stigchel & Theeuwes, 2005). This suggests that, at least in the case of 




attentional priority cannot easily be suppressed. This finding has implications for theories 
of oculomotor control during naturalistic eye movements, as it implies that oculomotor 
capture can occur as the result of an involuntary process of selection that does not critically 





Chapter V: Persistence of Value-driven Attentional Capture 
Material from this chapter was originally published in:  
Anderson, B. A., & Yantis, S. (2013). Persistence of value-driven attentional capture. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 39, 
6-9. 
 
1. Experiment 7 
 In all of the experiments presented thus far, value-driven attentional capture has 
been assessed very soon after the reward training took place. Thus, it is unknown how long 
the learned biases that underlie value-driven attentional capture persist, and whether these 
biases eventually extinguish in the absence of continued reinforcement. This is an 
important theoretical question with implications for our understanding of the mechanisms 
that underlie how reward learning modifies attentional priority.   
One possibility is that value-driven attentional biases are plastic and constantly 
evolve to reflect only recent reward history. According to such a mechanism of attentional 
control, only consistently reinforced patterns of attention allocation persist for extended 
periods of time. Another possibility is that reward learning creates enduring changes in 
attentional priority that can persist indefinitely without further learning. According to this 
mechanism of attentional control, organisms maximize their ability to capitalize on prior 
learning in the guidance of attention, at the possible expense of maintaining attentional 
biases that are no longer useful. In the present experiment, I provide evidence for a 
strikingly robust and persistent attentional bias for stimuli as a consequence of reward 
learning: the effects on attention of the reward trainings used in the experiments presented 
in Chapters III and IV are evident even several months after the reward learning has taken 






 Thirteen individuals from the Johns Hopkins University community were recruited 
to participate. Six had participated in Experiment 3, and four had participated in 
Experiment 5, and three had participated in Experiment 6. Eight participants had 
experienced red as the high-value color in their previous participation, and the other five 
had experienced green as the high-value color.  
 Between seven and nine months had elapsed between the initial training phase and 
participation in the present study. None of these participants had completed any study 
involving reward since participation in the initial study from which they were recruited. 
Participants were compensated with $10. 
2.2. Apparatus 
 The apparatus was identical to that of Experiment 1. 
2.3. Stimuli, Design, and Procedure 
 All participants experienced the same sequence of trial events in the present 
experiment that was used in the test phase of the study they previously participated in (see 
prior chapters).  
2.4. Assessment of Explicit Memory 
 At the end of the experiment, participants were reminded that they had been 
rewarded during the original learning phase of a prior experiment for finding red and green 
colored items, and were asked if they recalled which of the two colors tended to be followed 
by higher reward than the other. All of the participants reported no memory for which color 
had been the high-value color. 
3. Results 
 Despite the fact that over half a year had passed since their experience with the 
training phase, irrelevant but previously reward-associated stimuli still exerted a robust 
influence on response time in target identification, F(2,24) = 7.74, p = .003,   




11), in the absence of explicit memory for the previously learned stimulus–reward 
associations (see Methods). Whether the formerly high-value stimulus was red or green did 
not interact with the effect of the distractors on performance, F(2,22) = 1.01, p = .380. The 
effect of the distractors on performance also did not differ based on the specific training 
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Figure 11. Mean response time + within-subjects s.e.m. for each distractor condition in the test phase of 
Experiment 7. 
 
Post hoc comparisons revealed that the formerly high-value stimulus slowed RT 
both compared to when no formerly-rewarded stimulus was present, t(12) = 3.79, p = .003, 
d = 1.05, and when a formerly low-value stimulus was present, t(12) = 2.45, p = .031, d = .68. 
The difference in response slowing in the presence of formerly high- and low-value 
distractors can only be explained in terms of a difference in learned value, as that is all that 
differed between the two conditions. Accuracy was high and did not differ significantly 
among the three distractor conditions, F(2,24) = 1.24, p = .307, (absent: 92.6%, low-value: 
93.1%, high-value: 91.6%).  
4. Summary and Discussion 
 In the present study, I show that stimuli previously associated with reward capture 
attention as long as 7-9 months following reward learning, without any additional pairings 
with reward. This suggests that the attentional priorities of the visual system are modified 




of their utility. More broadly, the present results suggest that implicit memories are formed 
between a stimulus and reward that are stored in the brain in such a way that the stimulus 
will retain a heightened attentional priority whenever it is experienced, leading to the 
capture of attention. 
 The magnitude of value-driven attentional capture was greater for high-value than 
for low-value distractors; this difference was larger here than in prior studies presented in 
this dissertation. One possible account for this observation is that associations between 
stimuli and high reward are better remembered and are thus more robust to extinction over 
extended time periods than associations between stimuli and low reward. Nevertheless, 
these data show that the reward history associated with visual stimuli is maintained in such 





Chapter VI: General Conclusions and Theoretical Implications 
 In Chapter I, I made the argument that attentional selection can be conceptualized in 
terms of its ability to maximize reward outcomes, such that priority for selection reflects 
the overall value of the different stimuli in an environment. The stimuli of greatest reward 
value should be preferentially attended. Although it is clear from the prior literature that 
rewards influence attention, the extent to which reward history automatically guides 
attention independently of the current goals of the organism remains unexplored. Indeed, 
attentional selection has traditionally been conceptualized as reflecting two distinct 
mechanisms of control: a goal-directed mechanism and a salience-driven mechanism (e.g., 
Anderson, 2013; Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; 
Theeuwes, 2010).  
 In this dissertation, I provide evidence that stimuli of learned value automatically 
capture attention even when they are nonsalient, are known to be task-irrelevant, and are 
no longer associated with any rewards. I refer to this phenomenon as value-driven 
attentional capture: automatic attentional selection that is uniquely driven by the learned 
value of stimuli. Broadly, my findings show that the learning history of an organism with 
respect to the experience of reward outcomes has a strong and direct influence on 
attentional selection, via a devoted mechanism that is independent of goal-directed and 
salience-driven attention mechanisms.  
 Value-driven attention provides a mechanism by which reward-associated stimuli 
are selected and processed automatically. Prior to the publication of the work presented in 
this dissertation, reward was generally thought to modulate attention via voluntary and 
goal-directed mechanisms, primarily through processes involved in motivated perception 
(e.g., Kiss et al., 2009; Kristjansson et al., 2010; Navalpakkam et al., 2009, 2010; Pessoa & 




explain, at least in part, how organisms attend to stimuli that are associated with currently 
sought rewards; however, as I argue in Chapter I, this mechanism would also be likely to 
result in missed opportunities to obtain reward when the organism is either not expecting 
these opportunities or is engaged in other goal-directed processing at the time they are 
encountered. Here, I demonstrate that attention is automatically directed to stimuli as a 
function of reward history, bypassing the need for goal-directed selection. Thus, prior 
demonstrations of attention to reward-associated stimuli may reflect a more automatic and 
less voluntary mode of processing than previously thought. In a broader sense, the results 
of the present set of studies raise the question of how voluntary and goal-directed human 
cognition is more generally, a question that has been raised in other domains of cognition as 
well (Anderson & Folk, 2012a, 2014). 
 Attention has long been hypothesized to play an important role in reward learning: 
the strength with which a stimulus–reward association is learned is thought to be a function 
of how well the stimulus was attended (e.g., Holland & Gallagher, 1999; Pearce & Hall, 
1980). The findings presented in this dissertation indicate that reward learning also 
influences attention. Such value-driven attention may play an important role in facilitating 
associative reward learning: by automatically directing attention to a stimulus that co-
occurs with a reward outcome, the relationship between the two can be learned more 
quickly and effectively than might be the case if attention were unguided by reward. 
 The theory of incentive salience predicts that when stimuli are associated with the 
experience of a reward outcome, these reward cues become motivationally salient and 
automatically elicit approach behavior (e.g., Berridge, 2012; Berridge & Robinson, 1998; 
Robinson & Berridge, 2008). In essence, the cue comes to trigger a "wanting" response 
associated with the desire to obtain the reward it has been linked to. Incentive salience has 




even following long periods of abstinence (e.g., Berridge & Robinson, 1998). In order for a 
cue to trigger such a wanting response and subsequent approach behavior, however, it must 
first be processed, presumably requiring attention to the stimulus. Value-driven attention 
reflects a mechanism that would facilitate such approach behavior by rapidly and 
automatically prioritizing the processing of reward cues. 
 Stimuli associated with drugs of abuse (i.e., drug cues) have a powerful ability to 
automatically capture attention (e.g., Field & Cox, 2008; Lubman, Peters, Mogg, Bradley, & 
Deakin, 2000), and the magnitude of this capture is predictive of addiction relapse (Field & 
Cox, 2008; Marissen, Franken, Waters, Blanken, van den Brink, & Hendriks, 2006). This 
relationship between attention and addiction is consistent with the idea that value-driven 
attentional selection and cue-triggered wanting are related. The results of the studies 
presented in this dissertation suggest that attentional biases for drug cues may not be a 
specific consequence of drug use but rather a consequence of reward learning more 
generally. Consistent with the relationship between incentive salience and value-driven 
attention more broadly, I have shown that individuals in treatment for drug addiction are 
hypersensitive to the influence of non-drug reward on attention (Anderson, Faulkner, Rilee, 
Yantis, & Marvel, 2013). 
 Attentional priority to reward-related stimuli will often be adaptive when reward 
structures are stable, serving to maximize reward procurement. However, an inability to 
ignore formerly rewarding stimuli that run counter to current behavioral goals, such as 
unhealthy food in the case of obesity, can be highly maladaptive. Conversely, a tendency to 
ignore or pay too little attention to reward-related stimuli could be dysfunctional for 
wellbeing. In this way, the value-based modulation of attention may play a key role in a 
variety of clinical syndromes in which both attention and reward have been implicated, 




obesity (e.g., Davis, 2010), attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (e.g., Bush, 2010), 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (e.g., Sheppard et al., 2010), depression (e.g., Mathews & 
MacLeod, 2005), and autism (e.g., Sasson, Elison, Turner-Brown, Dichter, & Bodfish, 2011; 
Sasson, Turner-Brown, Holtzclaw, Lam, & Bodfish, 2008). Several of these conditions are 
highly comorbid (e.g., Bush, 2010; Davis, 2010; Sheppard et al., 2010), suggesting a common 
underlying mechanism that may be related to value-driven attention. More specifically, 
psychopathology might in part reflect over- or under-prioritization of certain types of 
reward information by the attention system. Future research using clinical populations 
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